BLOG by Joshua Micah Marshall

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05.08.04 -- 1:54AM // link | recommend

An uncomfortable backdrop to the Abu Ghraib story is the knowledge that various sorts of abuse are endemic throughout the American prison system. Along those lines, here's a clip from a piece in Saturday's Times by Fox Butterfield: "The experts also point out that the man who directed the reopening of the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq last year and trained the guards there resigned under pressure as director of the Utah Department of Corrections in 1997 after an inmate died while shackled to a restraining chair for 16 hours. The inmate, who suffered from schizophrenia, was kept naked the whole time. The Utah official, Lane McCotter, later became an executive of a private prison company, one of whose jails was under investigation by the Justice Department when he was sent to Iraq as part of a team of prison officials, judges, prosecutors and police chiefs picked by Attorney General John Ashcroft to rebuild the country's criminal justice system."

Meanwhile, on page 6 (link through then scroll down to page 6) of the latest edition of the Utah Sheriff's Association newsletter, The Utah Sheriff, is a picture of McCotter on "a tour of the death house at Abu Ghraib Prison" with Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. The figure in the background appears to be Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski.

--Josh Marshall

05.07.04 -- 10:37PM // link | recommend

Department of Scoundrels looking for that last refuge. This from Kate O'Beirne ...

The most recent images of abuse concerning Iraqi detainees will inevitably fuel the anti-Americanism that endangers American lives — not at the hands of sadistic young misfits but at the hands of our elected representatives. Members of Congress elbowing their way into camera range to question, in the absence of any evidence whatsoever, whether abuses were widespread and senior commanders were implicated and accusing the military of engaging in some cover-up are abusing the Abu Ghraib scandal and recklessly putting our troops at risk.

Stab-in-the-back bake mix. Limited assembly required. Do-it-yourself. Off-the-Shelf.

--Josh Marshall

05.07.04 -- 10:29PM // link | recommend

In the context of these recent revelations, these couple-month-old claims from British nationals released from Guantanamo Bay appear in a new light.

--Josh Marshall

05.07.04 -- 9:59PM // link | recommend

This article in tomorrow's Guardian suggests that some of these sexual humiliation methods apparently practiced at Abu Ghraib are taught to various special <$NoAd$> forces and military intelligence troops in the US and the UK, both to use them and also to prepare themselves to withstand them.

What's now happening in Iraq is that the same methods are being passed down to untrained and unsupervised reservists; and the whole situation spirals out of control.

I'm not sure this is the whole story. But it has a ring of truth to me, mixing, as it does, ugliness with disorganization and a spiralling cycle of unaccountability.

The sexual humiliation of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison was not an invention of maverick guards, but part of a system of ill-treatment and degradation used by special forces soldiers that is now being disseminated among ordinary troops and contractors who do not know what they are doing, according to British military sources.

The techniques devised in the system, called R2I - resistance to interrogation - match the crude exploitation and abuse of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib jail in Baghdad.

One former British special forces officer who returned last week from Iraq, said: "It was clear from discussions with US private contractors in Iraq that the prison guards were using R2I techniques, but they didn't know what they were doing."

He said British and US military intelligence soldiers were trained in these techniques, which were taught at the joint services interrogation centre in Ashford, Kent, now transferred to the former US base at Chicksands

...

Many British and US special forces soldiers learn about the degradation techniques because they are subjected to them to help them resist if captured. They include soldiers from the SAS, SBS, most air pilots, paratroopers and members of pathfinder platoons

...

"The crucial difference from Iraq is that frontline soldiers who are made to experience R2I techniques themselves develop empathy. They realise the suffering they are causing. But people who haven't undergone this don't realise what they are doing to people. It's a shambles in Iraq".

The British former officer said the dissemination of R2I techniques inside Iraq was all the more dangerous because of the general mood among American troops.

"The feeling among US soldiers I've spoken to in the last week is also that 'the gloves are off'. Many of them still think they are dealing with people responsible for 9/11".

Not an excuse, certainly, but here I think we can start to see the contours of the perfect storm -- hideous methods, at least reserved for restricted cases, parcelled out to unsupervised amateurs, abetted by what might be generously termed high-level indifference. Marathon Man? Lord of the Flies?

--Josh Marshall

05.07.04 -- 9:36PM // link | recommend

If there's a pattern here -- and I'm not sure we know <$NoAd$>enough yet to discern patterns -- it's one of military intelligence officers giving untrained and unsupervised soldiers vague instructions to 'soften up' prisoners to get them to talk in subsequent investigations.

That's a recipe for ugly results.

Here's a snippet from a new story from ABC News ...

The photographs show a 52-year-old former Baath Party official, Nadem Sadoon Hatab, who died at the detention center last June after a three-day period in which he was allegedly subjected to beatings and karate kicks to the chest and left to die naked in his own feces.

Abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Camp White Horse was allegedly carried out by U.S. Marine reservists. The accused reservists have told their lawyers they were given orders to "soften up" the men in their custody for interrogation by what were known as human exploitation teams from military intelligence.

...

According to testimony in the case, Hatab was targeted for especially harsh treatment because he was believed to be in possession of Jessica Lynch's 507th Army Battalion weapon and suspected of involvement in the ambush of her unit.

In this case, thankfully, a criminal prosecution is apparently well underway.

--Josh Marshall

05.07.04 -- 9:08PM // link | recommend

Among the more buck-passing and diversionery arguments proffered to explain what's emerged from Abu Ghraib is this truly far-fetched column by Linda Chavez, which seeks to lay the blame on having women in the ranks of the American military.

Now, you do have to sort of center yourself for a moment to be able to take such ridiculousness seriously. But here goes ...

Chavez's argument is that having women in integrated units is bad for good order and discipline. But more specifically she argues that "putting young men and women at their sexual prime in close proximity to each other 24 hours a day increases sexual tension [and that] military service has become heavily sexualized, with opportunities for male and female soldiers, sailors and Marines to engage in sexual fraternization, which, though frowned upon -- and in certain circumstances, forbidden -- is almost impossible to prevent."

Now, I don't think it makes much sense to draw any social policy lessons from this -- not about women in the military, gays in the military or anything else. The real issue is some ugly mix of poor oversight, abetting policy and the darker, more malleable side of human nature. Let's also note that the issue is not the nature of the sexual dimension of this, but the fact that it is coerced and punitive.

Yet who can ignore that the subtext of all this is homoerotic? And just how does having women in the armed forces contribute to this? If you're going to draw a social policy lesson from this, I'd say Chavez's is hardly the most logical. More plausible, though not the most probable explanation, would be the homophobia that is unfortunately quite entrenched in the US military and indeed throughout much of American society. Let's be frank, if there's an issue of 'sexual tension' involved when men try to humiliate other men by calling them 'fags' and forcing them to simulate homosexual acts, I'd say it's an issue of sexual tension between men, rather than between men and women.

--Josh Marshall

05.07.04 -- 8:17PM // link | recommend

A bunch of readers have asked me what it was Sen. Joe Lieberman said this morning that made me react so negatively. It was his words right out of the gate this morning at the Senate hearings ...

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, the behavior by Americans at the prison in Iraq is, as we all acknowledge, immoral, intolerable and un-American. It deserves the apology that you have given today and that have been given by others in high positions in our government and our military.

I cannot help but say, however, that those who were responsible for killing 3,000 Americans on September 11th, 2001, never apologized. Those who have killed hundreds of Americans in uniform in Iraq working to liberate Iraq and protect our security have never apologized.

And those who murdered and burned and humiliated four Americans in Fallujah a while ago never received an apology from anybody.

So it's part of -- wrongs occurred here, by the people in those pictures and perhaps by people up the chain of command.

But Americans are different. That's why we're outraged by this. That's why the apologies were due.

Ugly, pandering, a display of the cheapest tendencies <$Ad$>of the man.

Our moral superiority to mass murderers and people who desecrate people's bodies in town squares is, while thankfully true, simply not relevant to this issue.

This is the sort of subject-changing our parents try to wean us from when we're in grade school. (Okay, I did that. But look what Tommy did!) And of course there's the side-issue that Lieberman is playing to the notion that there's some sort of 'they did this to us and now we did this to them' issue here. And (how many times does it have to be said?) these folks in Abu Ghraib weren't the 9/11 planners.

Nothing Lieberman said is untrue precisely. It does set us apart from fascists and mass-murderers that Americans are outraged by this and that there will be investigations and accountability. But talk about defining deviance down!

In cases like this, emphasis is everything. And his was all wrong.

For Mr. Responsibility and Morality, what a disappointment.

He can take a lesson not only from John McCain but from Lindsey Graham too.

--Josh Marshall

05.07.04 -- 2:29PM // link | recommend

I've only seen portions of today's testimony. From what I've seen the Pentagon needs new civilian management. But then we knew that. Or at least that's long been my judgment. Yet take note of this snap poll from ABC which says that very few Americans seem to think Rumsfeld's head should roll over this.

Secondly, I've always had a love/hate feeling (I'd say love/hate relationship but obviously he has no idea who I am) about Joe Lieberman. After his statement today, no love.

--Josh Marshall

05.07.04 -- 10:20AM // link | recommend

You know things haven't reached anything near the equilibrium phase for Don Rumsfeld when you see something like this. Yesterday afternoon or evening -- I don't remember precisely when -- the headline on MSNBC was something to the effect of 'Rumsfeld to go on offensive'.

I remember reading that and thinking, offensive against who? Who's he going to attack?

This morning the headlines everywhere read 'Rumsfeld to apologize.' So the ground is moving under their feet. All the normal signs point to Rumsfeld being history. But I still can't get myself to think that this White House, at this political moment, will kick him overboard.

On a lighter note, this might be an apt time to review that classic book of maxims Rumsfeld's Rules -- here in .pdf and here in html.

Some points now make for interesting reading ...

In the execution of presidential decisions work to be true to his views, in fact and tone.

If you foul up, tell the president and correct it fast. Delay only compounds mistakes.

Stay tuned ...

--Josh Marshall

05.07.04 -- 10:00AM // link | recommend

A letter to the editor of Stars and Stripes, from an MP serving in Baghdad. Worth reading.

--Josh Marshall

05.07.04 -- 1:42AM // link | recommend

From an article in the Post: "Some U.S. officials said Rumsfeld was resistant to repeated warnings from Iraq governor L. Paul Bremer -- delivered as early as last fall -- that the United States was detaining too many Iraqis for too long and in poor conditions. Bremer told Rumsfeld and other senior administration officials that if the problem persisted, the political fallout in Iraq would be serious, the officials said."

And following up on Thursday's post about the prohibitive political costs of canning Rumsfeld, this from the same article in the Post: "A White House official said that it is the view of a number of people close to Bush that getting rid of Rumsfeld would be 'a self-inflicted political and policy wound disproportionate to the secretary's responsibility for this human failure on the part of a small number of soldiers.'"

Finally, the same Post article suggests something I'd heard from a source on Wednesday: that the Miller report from last October -- the one that seemed to recommend more Gitmo-style rules for interrogations and imprisonment in Iraq -- was itself ordered because of reports of problems with the detention of prisoners in the country. As for myself, I still have some question whether Miller was sent out there -- remember he went in August and September -- because the insurgency was heating up at the time and it was felt that ... well, more needed to be done.

--Josh Marshall

05.07.04 -- 1:18AM // link | recommend

Here's an idea or something possibly to consider (and I have to thank a reader --JS -- for reminding me of this connection).

In many of the articles on this emerging Iraqi prisoners story, it has been claimed that some of the key instigators or enablers of bad acts were military intelligence officers.

Now, who's the head of military intelligence? 'Head' is too vague. There's no such post per se. But what comes pretty close is the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence.

And who's that? Lt. Gen. William G. "Jerry" Boykin.

Remember him? He's the one who got in trouble last year for describing his battle with a Muslim Somali warlord by saying "I knew that my God was bigger than his God. I knew that my God was a real God and his was an idol", saying President Bush was chosen by God, and generally that the war on terror is an apocalyptic struggle between Christianity and Satan.

Last fall, after Boykin's efforts to channel Charlemagne or perhaps Urban II became known, he asked Don Rumsfeld to initiate an 'investigation' into whether his comments "violated any Pentagon rules or procedures" whatever that might mean. Just this week it was reported that the 'investigation' still continues; and Boykin has not been disciplined in any way.

In any case, I doubt very much that all this mess we've gotten ourselves into is attributable to this one man. But at what point in this scandal does someone ask whether some of this might have some connection to the fact that the guy running military intelligence believes the war on terror is a literal holy war pitting Christian America against Satan and his Muslim minions?

And then there's another possibility, perhaps distinct, perhaps overlapping.

An article in the Guardian -- this piece is truly gripping, a must-read -- there is an interview with a military intelligence officer who served at Guantanamo and then later served at Abu Ghraib as a contractor for CACI.

The upshot of the piece is that the place is so mismanaged and there's so much pressure for contractors to produce people to fill slots as interrogators that they end up sending people with no experience whatsoever. "If you're in such a hurry to get bodies," he says, "you end up with cooks and truck drivers doing intelligence work."

The intelligence officer, who was involved in processing people at Guantanamo, thinks that more than a third of the people in custody there had no ties to terrorism at all.

And then there are passages like this that are at once entirely predictable and yet leave you wondering what things have come to ...

"A unit goes out on a raid and they have a target and the target is not available; they just grab anybody because that was their job," Mr Nelson said, referring to counter-insurgency operations in Iraq. "The troops are under a lot of stress and they don't know one guy from the next. They're not cultural experts. All they want is to count down the days and hopefully go home.

"I've read reports from capturing units where the capturing unit wrote, 'the target was not at home. The neighbour came out to see what was going on and we grabbed him'," he said.

According to Mr Nelson's account, the victims' very innocence made them more likely to be abused, because the interrogators refused to believe they could have been picked up on such arbitrary grounds. Interrogators "weren't interested in going through the less glamorous work of sifting through the chaff to get to the kernels of truth from the willing detainees; they were interested in 'breaking' tough targets", he said

Then there's the matter, reported some time ago, that one contractor working in Iraq was employing Apartheid-era paramilitaries, some of whom had had to seek amnesty from the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission for war crimes, terrorism and murders they'd committed under the old regime.

It gets deeper and darker.

--Josh Marshall

05.06.04 -- 10:03PM // link | recommend

From a late article out from USA Today: "Shortly before Bush administration officials presented Republican congressional leaders with a request for $25 billion in Iraq funding this week, Secretary of State Colin Powell was telling members of the Congressional Black Caucus that no such request would be forthcoming ... Powell's associates tried to downplay the mix-up. But it underscores the continuing rift between President Bush's departments of State and Defense and deepens the impression that the nation's top diplomat is being cut out of the decision-making process."

Can the president apologize for humiliating this guy too? Even apologizing to Abdullah would be a start.

--Josh Marshall

05.06.04 -- 9:03PM // link | recommend

I see no point dragging out this presidential apology business any more. The president did what he was willing to do after the politicals told him the first try wasn't enough. Everyone's drawn their conclusions, and so forth. But what precisely was the idea in apologizing to Abdullah and then going out and announcing that he'd apologized to Abdullah?

Abdullah's an Arab. And he's from nextdoor to Iraq. And he was in town. Actually he was at my house. So I figured I'd apologize to him. How's that? Did I mentioned that I apologized to Abdullah?

And how about Rush Limbaugh's idea of a fun night out and blowing off steam?

You know when you're worked to the bone and you really need to unwind there's just nothing like grabbing a half dozen Arab dudes, stripping them naked, tying their bodies together against their will and pressing one guy's penis up against another guy's butt to make it like they're having anal sex. Right?

Party time for Rush, it would seem, is a mix of Studio 54 and Jack the Ripper.

As fun as A Clockwork Orange.

It's the Abner Louimafication of regime change.

--Josh Marshall

05.06.04 -- 8:05PM // link | recommend

An interesting tidbit from this evening's <$NoAd$>edition of The (must-read) Nelson Report ...

We can contribute a second hand anecdote to newspaper stories on rising concern, last year, from Secretary of State Powell and Deputy Secretary Armitage about Administration attitudes and the risks they might entail: according to eye witnesses to debate at the highest levels of the Administration...the highest levels...whenever Powell or Armitage sought to question prisoner treatment issues, they were forced to endure what our source characterizes as "around the table, coarse, vulgar, frat-boy bully remarks about what these tough guys would do if THEY ever got their hands on prisoners...."

-- let's be clear: our source is not alleging "orders" from the White House. Our source is pointing out that, as we said in the Summary, a fish rots from its head. The atmosphere created by Rumsfeld's controversial decisions was apparently aided and abetted by his colleagues in their callous disregard for the implications of the then-developing situation, and by their ridicule of the only combat veterans at the top of this Administration.

Tough guys ...

--Josh Marshall

05.06.04 -- 1:41PM // link | recommend

There's a rush of new articles out this afternoon which, at first blush, make me think Don Rumsfeld is finished.

An article in Reuters has a Republican senate staffer saying this about what Rumsfeld needs to do to keep his job ...

A Senate Republican aide said Rumsfeld must "give the performance of his life," and show contrition.

"He needs to have full disclosure of the facts, no parsing of words or displaying the usual convoluted testimony that the Senate Armed Services Committee has been accustomed to," the Republican aide said.

As far as people losing their jobs goes, political storms have two phases: a dynamic phase and an equilibrium phase. The first comes right after the revelation when everything is influx and the person <$Ad$>on the line is wholly embattled. Usually, and always if the person in question is to survive, you then reach a point of equilibrium where the person's defenders find some point, some firm ground, on which they feel they can defend him.

If that second stage doesn't kick in quickly the person is almost always finished. In virtually every case, what does someone in is not an abundance of critics but a lack of defenders.

One thing that makes Rumsfeld more vulnerable is that he's already lost what was once a key pillar of support: hawks and neocons. Just recently, Bill Kristol and Bob Kagan wrote a piece in the Weekly Standard that all but called on Bush to fire Rumsfeld.

For all these reasons it's difficult for me to see where Rumsfeld's equilibrium comes from. Yet there's an added political question.

Let's say Rumsfeld resigns on Friday. The election is still six months away. And the nation is at war. So a new Defense Secretary would be needed more or less immediately. That would open up a very uncomfortable prospect for the administration.

Confirmation hearings for a new Sec Def would, I think, inevitably turn into a national forum for discussing the management of the Pentagon, the planning for the war and the lack of planning for the occupation. The new nominee would be drawn into all sorts of uncomfortble public second-guessing of what's happened up until this point. Sure, that's stuff under Rumsfeld. But, really, it's stuff under Bush -- the civilian head of the United States military.

That, I have to imagine, is something the White House would like to avoid at any cost.

--Josh Marshall

05.06.04 -- 11:00AM // link | recommend

Le Monde has posted some hand-written letters <$NoAd$>home from Sergeant Ivan L. "Chip" Frederick II. Frederick is one the soldiers at the heart of the prison scandal in Iraq. And these letters were in the form of accounts of behavior he was both participating in but also morally troubled by.

I've just skimmed through so far. But this section, which I've transcribed to the best of my ability, is one that jumped out at me ...

Back around Nov[ember] an OGA prisoner was brought to IA. They stressed him out so bad that the man passed away. They put his body in a body bag and packed him in ice for approximately 24 hours in the shower in 1B. The next day the medics came in and put his body on a stretcher, placed a fake I.V. in his arm and took him away. This OGA was never processed and therefore never had a number.

That's on page 10 of the .pdf document on the Le Monde website. It's also noted in Hersh's piece in The New Yorker.

--Josh Marshall

05.06.04 -- 10:09AM // link | recommend

Lettin' off a little steam ...

Rush <$NoAd$>Limbaugh from yesterday ...

This is no different than what happens at the Skull and Bones initiation and we're going to ruin people's lives over it and we're going to hamper our military effort, and then we are going to really hammer them because they had a good time. You know, these people are being fired at every day. I'm talking about people having a good time, these people, you ever heard of emotional release? You of heard of need to blow some steam off?

Another example of how a war for liberal democracy can't be run by the most illiberal people in our society.

And just what is Rush's idea of a 'good time'?

--Josh Marshall

05.06.04 -- 1:59AM // link | recommend

Now Marc Zell (yesterday quoted at length in Salon trashing Ahmed Chalabi) denies everything.

In his letter Zell says, "I have never met with Mr. Ahmed Chalabi nor have I ever held any discussions with him. I have no personal knowledge of his past or present dealings, other than what I myself read in the international and national press."

It seems a little hard to figure that he knows so little since he's in business with Chalabi's nephew. But read the exchange and make up your own mind.

--Josh Marshall

05.06.04 -- 12:45AM // link | recommend

There is a passage in the Taguba Report that reads as follows ...

MG Miller’s team recognized that they were using JTF-GTMO operational procedures and interrogation authorities as baselines for its observations and recommendations. There is a strong argument that the intelligence value of detainees held at JTF-Guantanamo (GTMO) is different than that of the detainees/internees held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and other detention facilities in Iraq. Currently, there are a large number of Iraqi criminals held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). These are not believed to be international terrorists or members of Al Qaida, Anser Al Islam, Taliban, and other international terrorist organizations.

There's a lot of jargon here. So let me try to add a little <$Ad$>context and explanation.

"MG Miller" is Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller, until recently the commanding officer of the U.S. detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. He was just recently placed in command the US prison system in Iraq.

In August and September of last year Miller went to Iraq to study and report on the prison facilities the US military was running in the country and how they were being utilized for generating intelligence by means of interrogations. He made his report in October.

[ed. note: I got some hints this evening of high-level interest in the contents of Miller's report. And I strongly suspect that we'll be seeing that report show up in print and online some time pretty soon.]

In the passage above, Taguba makes the point that Miller was using Gitmo rules as "the baselines for its observations and recommendations" for how things should be conducted in Iraq.

Now, there are all sorts of problems with what's happening at Guantanamo Bay. In my mind, the issue is not so much the particular conditions and procedures -- which are hard to determine since everything is so secret -- but the fact that the US government has tried from the first to argue that the camp is literally off-limits for law of any sort. Geneva Convention rules don't apply. US courts have no oversight whatsoever. Nothing.

That's simply beyond the pale in a democratic state under the rule of law. Everybody gets to go before a magistrate. Even if it's a hanging judge. Everybody.

Now, having said that, it's not hard to see why different procedures might be called for if you're dealing with active and hardened terrorists (though with no rule of law at Guantanamo there's really no way to know if that's even the case). But in Iraq you've got everything from petty criminals to bona-fide terrorists in detention. And between those two extreme categories you've got plenty of people picked up for various levels of association with the former regime, sympathy with various anti-American groups, insurgent violence, people picked in raids looking for intelligence, innumerable people who were just at the wrong place at the wrong time, almost everything under the sun.

Many are probably, no doubt, not the most pleasant folks. But to imply, as Taguba does, that we shouldn't be applying Guantanamo rules to these folks is really an understatement. Basically, the idea seems to be that we're taking the unprecedented and extra-legal Gitmo rules and applying them as the baseline for how we're going to deal with everyone we take into custody in Iraq.

Now, we can't draw too much from Taguba's brief description of what Miller's report contains or the context of its commission. And certainly this doesn't mean that everyone in Iraq literally got the Gitmo treatment. But I can't think of a more tangible example of the corrosive effect our embrace of lawlessness at Guantanamo has had on our conduct. First we devise these outlandish rules to deal with the worst bad guys behind 9/11 and the next thing you know we're applying those brave new rules to miscellaneous bad actors who fall into our net in Iraq. What are we looking at here but the fraudulent connection between Iraq and 9/11 suddenly become flesh, as we look into our own faces and see a paler shade of our enemies looking back at us?

--Josh Marshall

05.06.04 -- 12:24AM // link | recommend

Sy Hersh from last night on O'Reilly ...

First of all, it's going to get much worse. This kind of stuff was much more widespread. I can tell you just from the phone calls I've had in the last 24 hours, even more, there are other photos out there. There are many more photos even inside that unit. There are videotapes of stuff that you wouldn't want to mention on national television that was done. There was a lot of problems.

There was a special women's section. There were young boys in there. There were things done to young boys that were videotaped. It's much worse. And the Maj. Gen. Taguba was very tough about it. He said this place was riddled with violent, awful actions against prisoners.

Worse and worse.

--Josh Marshall

05.05.04 -- 7:46PM // link | recommend

I feel knocked on my <$NoAd$>heels by this stuff.

From the AP:

U.S. soldiers who detained an elderly Iraqi woman last year placed a harness on her, made her crawl on all fours and rode her like a donkey, Prime Minister Tony Blair's personal human rights envoy to Iraq said Wednesday.

The envoy, legislator Ann Clwyd, said she had investigated the claims of the woman in her 70s and believed they were true."

...

"She was held for about six weeks without charge," the envoy told Wednesday's Evening Standard newspaper. "During that time she was insulted and told she was a donkey. A harness was put on her, and an American rode on her back."

Clwyd said the woman has recovered physically but remains traumatized.

"I am satisfied the case has now been resolved satisfactorily," the envoy told British Broadcasting Corp. radio Wednesday. "She got a visit last week from the authorities, and she is about to have her papers and jewelry returned to her."

I can't think of anything to say.

--Josh Marshall

05.05.04 -- 4:42PM // link | recommend

Can someone explain this quote to <$NoAd$>me?

This passage is from an AP story on the White House's new request for a $25 billion supplemental appropriation for operations in Iraq, more than six months ahead of schedule ...

In recent weeks, administration officials have raised the possibility that they also will need extra money for the final weeks of this fiscal year, with many members of Congress saying they believe billions will be needed.

But as recently as Monday, a senior administration official downplayed the need for money right now for U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

So far, Bush ``has not been told that there is a resource problem,'' said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

That official also said there was currently enough money for reconstruction in Iraq.

A bad CEO.

Along similar lines see this cartoon.

--Josh Marshall

05.04.04 -- 8:16PM // link | recommend

KING HENRY. I dare say you love him not so ill to wish him here alone, howsoever you speak this, to feel other men's minds; methinks I could not die anywhere so contented as in the King's company, his cause being just and his quarrel honourable.

MICHAEL WILLIAMS. That's more than we know.

JOHN BATES. Ay, or more than we should seek after; for we know enough if we know we are the King's subjects. If his cause be wrong, our obedience to the King wipes the crime of it out of us.

MICHAEL WILLIAMS. But if the cause be not good, the King himself hath a heavy reckoning to make when all those legs and arms and heads, chopp'd off in a battle, shall join together at the latter day and cry all 'We died at such a place'- some swearing, some crying for a surgeon, some upon their wives left poor behind them, some upon the debts they owe, some upon their children rawly left. I am afeard there are few die well that die in a battle; for how can they charitably dispose of anything when blood is their argument? Now, if these men do not die well, it will be a black matter for the King that led them to it; who to disobey were against all proportion of subjection.

King Henry V
Act IV, Scene I

--Josh Marshall

05.04.04 -- 7:40PM // link | recommend

Inevitably, the full text of the Taguba Report goes online.

--Josh Marshall

05.04.04 -- 6:48PM // link | recommend

Don Rumsfeld: "I think that -- I'm not a lawyer. <$NoAd$>My impression is that what has been charged thus far is abuse, which I believe technically is different from torture. I don't know if it is correct to say what you just said, that torture has taken place, or that there's been a conviction for torture. And therefore I'm not going to address the torture word."

Taguba Report: "Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees; pouring cold water on naked detainees; beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair; threatening male detainees with rape; allowing a military police guard to stitch the wound of a detainee who was injured after being slammed against the wall in his cell; sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom stick, and using military working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one instance actually biting a detainee."

--Josh Marshall

05.04.04 -- 5:49PM // link | recommend

Doug Feith today at AEI: "No one can properly assert that the failure, so far, to find Iraqi WMD stockpiles undermines the reasons for the war."

--Josh Marshall

05.04.04 -- 12:14PM // link | recommend

Shaken, but apparently not stirred.

Yesterday in a Q & A with editors from Detroit area newspapers President Bush said he was "shaken" by reports of abuse of prisoners in US military custody in Iraq. Yet, according to his press secretary this morning, he hasn't even looked at the Taguba Report, the one people around the world are buzzing about in disappointment and outrage and half of Washington seems already to be reading.

In fact, in this exchange from that Q & A yesterday it wasn't even clear the president knew what the report was ...

Q: Are you concerned that there was a report completed in February that apparently --

THE PRESIDENT: I haven't seen --

Q: -- Myers didn't know about yesterday --

THE PRESIDENT: Well, if Myers didn't know about it, I didn't know about it. In other words, he's part of the chain -- actually, he's not in the chain of command, but he's a high ranking official. We'll find out.

Q: The question is, should something causing --

THE PRESIDENT: I just need to know --

Q: -- concern, raised eyebrows --

THE PRESIDENT: Exactly. I think you'll find the investigation started quickly when they found out what was going on. What I need to know is what the investigators concluded.

From this exchange, the president <$Ad$>seemed unaware of what the report even was and claimed to believe that he somehow couldn't get a hold of it until it came up through the chain of command.

The point here isn't that the president is stupid, but that he seems blithely indifferent to what is a huge setback to American goals and standing in the Middle East and indeed throughout the world.

There's an echo here of his response to the pre-9/11 warnings streaming up through the government bureaucracy. It hasn't landed on his desk yet, with an action plan, so what is he supposed to do? He talked to Rumsfeld who says he's on top of it. So what more can be done?

This isn't a matter of the aesthetics of leadership. It is another example of how this president is a passive commander-in-chief, how he demands no accountability and, because of that, allows problems to fester and grow. Though this may not be a direct example of it, he also creates a climate tolerant of rule-breaking that seeps down into the ranks of his subordinates, mixing with and reinforcing those other shortcomings.

The disasters now facing the country in Iraq -- some in slow motion, others by quick violence -- aren't just happening on the president's watch. They are happening in a real sense, really in the deepest sense, because of him -- because of his attention to the simulacra of leadership rather than the real thing, which is more difficult and demanding, both personally and morally.

--Josh Marshall

05.04.04 -- 10:38AM // link | recommend

Is that the report from The New <$NoAd$>Yorker?

From this morning ...

Question: Scott, one question. Has the president read the Taguba report yet? I mean, it's all over the media, everybody else seems to have read it.

Answer: Is this the one that General Myers was asked about?

Question: The one the New Yorker wrote about, and that the New York --

Answer: No.

Question: -- Times is writing about. He hasn't read it yet. Is he --

Answer: Yeah, no, that's why the president called Secretary Rumsfeld, to make sure that the military was taking strong steps to address the matter and prevent prisoner abuse from happening again.

Question: But this report says that it's more widespread --

Answer: Yeah, and that's why the Pentagon has taken a -- has a number of investigations going on right now, looking into these issues. And they are pursuing charges against individuals who may be responsible for what occurred and the president -- and they're also taking a comprehensive look at the entire prison system to make sure there's no systematic problem.

Question: Thanks.

Answer: He very much wants to -- wants the Pentagon to take a broad look at this and take action against those who were responsible for these appalling acts.

Our CEO President ...

[ed. note: The exchange above is from a pool report made available this morning to reporters traveling with the president.]

--Josh Marshall

05.04.04 -- 9:57AM // link | recommend

From George Will: "This administration cannot <$Ad$>be trusted to govern if it cannot be counted on to think and, having thought, to have second thoughts. Thinking is not the reiteration of bromides about how "all people yearn to live in freedom" (McClellan). And about how it is "cultural condescension" to doubt that some cultures have the requisite aptitudes for democracy (Bush). And about how it is a "myth" that "our attachment to freedom is a product of our culture" because "ours are not Western values; they are the universal values of the human spirit" (Tony Blair)."

The whole piece is worth a read.

Here's my post from last evening on why I suspect the built-up impediments to thought on their part are piled too high to be overcome, even if they wished to -- itself a proposition for which there is scant evidence.

--Josh Marshall

05.04.04 -- 12:22AM // link | recommend

I had promised myself: no more posts until tomorrow. But for this article ("How Ahmed Chalabi conned the neocons") out tonight in Salon I will make an exception.

This is one of those 'where to start' articles.

Let's start here. "Ahmed Chalabi is a treacherous, spineless turncoat. He had one set of friends before he was in power, and now he's got another ... He said he would end Iraq's boycott of trade with Israel, and would allow Israeli companies to do business there. He said [the new Iraqi government] would agree to rebuild the pipeline from Mosul [in the northern Iraqi oil fields] to Haifa [the Israeli port, and the location of a major refinery]."

Who said that?

That would be Marc Zell, frequent target of TPM barbs, former law partner of Undersecretary of Defense Doug Feith, and the guy who went into business just after the war with Chalabi's nephew Salem "Sam" Chalabi.

So apparently all is not well at Regime Change Ranch.

The broad outlines of this story -- Chalabi ditching his neocon friends for the Iranian mullahs -- have been clear for some time. But here it is in all its lurid detail. And though one can dispute this or that point of author John Dizard's interpretations -- I would dispute a few of them -- he's got neocons on the record dumping on Chalabi and the members of the Chalabi clan dumping on them.

And those quotations just aren't open to interpretation.

The upshot of the piece is that Chalabi's neocon supporters are beginning to realize that he is every bit the huckster and fraud that his most unyielding enemies at State and CIA said he was. He lured them in with all manner of improbable claims about the pain-free peace he'd make with Israel, how he'd upend Arab nationalism and generally make all the intractable conundrums of the region disappear.

In the popular political imagination we're familiar with the neocons as conniving militarists, masters of intrigue and cabals, graspers for the oil supplies of the world, and all the rest. But here we have them in what I suspect is the truest light: as college kid rubes who head out for a weekend in Vegas, get scammed out of their money by a two-bit hustler on the first night and then get played for fools by a couple hookers who leave them naked and handcuffed to their hotel beds.

And just think, it's on your dime and with your nation's honor -- what an added benefit.

I don't mean to accuse the whole group that is sometimes classed under that label. Some are serious wrestlers with our nation's dilemmas and challenges. But for the most venal and gullible of them, which, truth be told, makes up the larger part, it's an apt description.

Read the article and you'll understand what I mean.

--Josh Marshall

05.03.04 -- 4:52PM // link | recommend

One of the things I've found difficult about writing about Iraq in recent days is imputing some level of seriousness to the arguments of the president and his retainers who continue to press an optimistic view of what's happening in Iraq. From them, on any given day, you can still hear the argument that, notwithstanding some tough days, things are still getting better in Iraq and the key to success is sticking with it.

At the same time, I talk to, or have conversations related to me with, various foreign policy, intelligence and military experts, all of whom --- across the political spectrum --- seem to believe that things are about as bleak as they can be. On top of this, they seem uniform in the belief -- sometimes based on inference, other times based on direct knowledge -- that the White House is fresh out of ideas about what to do, and basically hasn't any idea how to proceed.

Either the president knows the situation is that bad or he (and perhaps his advisors too) is just too out of touch to have any idea what's happening. Increasingly, I think that the president is just too small-minded and vainglorious a man to come to grips with the situation.

A strong president, a good president, would put his country before his pride and throw himself into saving the situation even if it meant admitting previous mistakes and ditching past policies and advisors. But I don't think this president has the character to do that.

Making a clean sweep, firing some of his most compromised advisors, admitting some past mistakes -- not for effect, but so that those mistakes could be more thoroughly and rapidly overcome -- might well doom the president politically. But I doubt there's any question they'd be in the best interests of the country.

This president seems either disinclined to or unable to do more than preside over a drift into disaster while putting on a game face.

(Kevin Drum has an excellent post today on President Bush as the prototypical bad CEO -- Here's a snippet: "Bush styles himself a 'CEO president,' but the world is full to bursting with CEOs who have goals they would dearly love to attain but who lack either the skill or the fortitude to make them happen. They assign tasks to subordinates without making sure the subordinates are capable of doing them — but then consider the job done anyway because they've "delegated" it. They insist they want a realistic plan, but they're unwilling to do the hard work of creating one — all those market research reports are just a bunch of ivory tower nonsense anyway. They work hard — but only on subjects in their comfort zone.")

There's all this talk about what might be the best critique of the president's policies (politically and substantively), what the best alternative policies might be, and so forth. But all of that, I think, misses the point. This president is too compromised by his deceptions, his past lack of accountability and his acquiescence in failed policies, ever to correct the situation. Like C.S. Lewis's metaphor about the road to hell being easy to walk down, but the further walked, harder and harder to turn back upon, this president is just too far gone with misleading the public, covering up and indulging incompetence, and embracing venality ever to make a clean break and start retrieving the situation.

--Josh Marshall

05.02.04 -- 11:11PM // link | recommend

Let's return to the scandal at the heart of the Iraqi oil-for-food program.

The heart of matter, again, is that Saddam Hussein allegedly used the program to engineer pay-offs to a long list political leaders and journalists around the world. The problem is that none of the documents which are said to support this claim have been seen, let alone authenticated by any neutral observers.

In its current issue The Economist states: "Nothing, so far, has been proved, certainly not as far as the UN is concerned. His evidence and nearly all the other allegations against the UN have so far been based on documents found in Iraqi government archives. But no one, other than he and the GC's 25 members, has seen or authenticated the documents."

That point about the twenty-five members of the Interim Governing Council probably overstates the matter. The documents are in the charge of the Finance Committee of the IGC. And the Finance Committee is controlled by Ahmed Chalabi. The Chalabi-controlled investigation is being headed up by a man named Claude Hankes-Drielsma. He's the 'he' referred to in the quotation above. The Economist calls him, "a British financial adviser who was appointed by his old friend, Mr Chalabi, who chairs the finance committee of the GC in Iraq, to advise it on its investigations into the affair."

At the moment, there is a tug-of-war between Hankes-Drielsma and Chalabi on the one hand and Paul Bremer and the CPA on the other. The CPA wants to run an investigation out of the hands of 'politicians' (read: Chalabi) whose involvement might taint the results. But thus far, Hankes-Drielsma and Chalabi have resisted turning over the relevant documents to either the investigators at the CPA or the Volcker Commission which was appointed by Kofi Annan to investigate the matter on behalf of the UN.

This issue of the custody of the documents came up in congressional testimony on April 21st.

Let me reprint a portion of it in which Congressman Dutch Ruppersberger (D-MD) was questioning Hankes-Drielsma ...

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Is that true that no papers documenting the allegations that you've made today have been given to the United Nations?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: No, that's true.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Right. Well, I want to get into that. Let me finish this and we'll get into that. And then you -- that the accounting firm KPMG was preparing a report the world body would receive. Now, that's true?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: Yes.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Okay. "In January an Iraqi newspaper published a list of 270 groups and individuals, many of them past and present government officials, charging they received vouchers for oil they can sell. Hankes-Drielsma calls the list only the tip of the iceberg." Is that true?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: Correct.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Okay. Is there anything -- and let me start from the back and go forward. Is there anything that you haven't testified so far today that would add to your comment that this is only the tip of the iceberg?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: No.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: So really most of what you've given us today is where you would stand, and you don't have any additional information that would help in the hard evidence to try to prove or disprove these allegations?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: At this stage we have to wait for the KPMG report.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Okay.

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: But the list is certainly only part of the problem. We 're talking about 10 percent added to invoices, so a complete list needs to be produced of all suppliers. KPMG are looking at all the illegal oil sales and what happened to that cash. KPMG have already secured a list of all the Iraqi accounts held in the name of individuals on behalf of Iraq. KPMG, with the Audit Bureau of Iraq, will be requesting the banks to provide five year records of all transactions on those accounts. So the work that needs to be done is very extensive and so that list that the media is focused on is only part of the big picture.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Who has retained KPMG or who is paying them right now?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: Well, the appointment by KPMG being made by the Iraq Governing Council was done by the Finance Committee with the CPA present, but --

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: And who's chairman of the Finance Committee?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: Dr. Chalabi.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Is he in charge of that investigation on behalf of the Iraqi Governing Council now?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: He and his colleagues on the Finance Committee.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Yeah, but there's one chairman, just like we have a chairman here.

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: So the chair --

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: His duty is that he's in charge and he's the -- of conducting this investigation as it relates to what we've talked about here today, and right now the Iraqi Governing Council is paying KPMG to conduct this investigation?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: No. First of all, as I testified earlier, the Governing Council unanimously endorsed the decision to appoint KPMG. But at this stage, although initial indications -- assurances were given by Ambassador Bremer that the Iraq Development Fund would pay for the work, this has not been reconfirmed by the CPA. The Governing Council certainly doesn't have at this stage any resources to pay KPMG, because all the Iraqi money is in the Iraq Development Fund, over which Ambassador Bremer has sole signing authority.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: But basically the Iraqi Governing Council retained or --

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: Retains KPMG.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Retains KPMG to do the work they're doing to investigate the alleged corruption that has been put out here today?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: Correct.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Now, the only issue now is that the Iraqi Governing Council through Chalabi is trying to get Bremer to be able to pay for this. Is that correct?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: Correct.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: And Bremer is leaving now. Correct?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: Ah --

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: In two months.

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: You will know more about that than --

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Do you know who's taking his place?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: I know who's going to be the ambassador.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Who is that?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: I understand from the media that it's Ambassador Negroponte.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Yeah, but is Negroponte also on the investigation committee appointed by Annan, which is Volcker and Annan?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: No.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: He's not? Okay. And by the way, I want to say about the appointment of Volcker on that committee, I am very impressed with the credibility of Volcker. He's a tough individual who will get to the bottom if he's given the resources and the ability to get that facts and data that are needed. Do you agree with that?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: I agree with that.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Okay. So I think we've cleared up as far as where KPMG is supposed -- Bremer will pay them. What's going to happen then?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: Well, if the CPA refuses to pay for this I think it will be a very sad day for the Iraqi people.

REP. SHAYS: I would agree.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Yeah, and I would agree too. Okay. The final issue, I just want to ask you the question. You talk about K -- and maybe --

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: (Cross talk) -- KPMG.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: KPMG.

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: KPMG.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: That's it. I've been doing KM, it's KPMG. Okay, that's taken care of.

REP. SHAYS: I'll write it out for him.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Okay, I've got it. One plus one is two. Now, the issue with respect to the information that KPMG have developed right now. I'm very much concerned that we're waiting -- that the United Nations is waiting for something when in fact there could be crimes and cover-ups going on at this point. This is going to have a tremendous impact, in my opinion, in world media and I think this is something that we have to deal with right away and move as quickly as we can. What is the hold up with respect to KPMG or you or any information the Iraqi Governing Council has, to getting it to the authorities immediately, right now? And why wait or hold back when you yourself said today you're concerned about shredding of documents?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: Because an investigation needs to be thoroughly done. The documents -- there needs to be forensic work done on them. And the information -- some of the transactions need to be traced, ultimate beneficiaries need to be identified. And if you produce a document that is half baked, you will end up being criticized for precisely the reasons that we want to try and avoid. That this needs to be done professionally and properly.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: But my point is that Volcker is out there investigating, you're going to communicate with him. It seems to me that KPMG and any information that they have or you have should be brought to the table with Volcker and move as quickly as possible. Why isn't that being done?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: Well, you're prejudging what might happen. We haven't had a discussion with Mr. Volcker. We suggested the meeting with Mr. Volcker. It was not at a request at this stage of Mr. Volcker, although the U.N. has suggested it -- internal -- the IOS has. We suggested it. The first opportunity for us -- and Mr. Bates is flying over specially tonight from the U.K. to actually be present at that meeting so we can discuss --

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: So when is that meeting?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: Tomorrow morning.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: That's very good. Tomorrow morning with Mr. Volcker and the other gentleman?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: I don't know who else Mr. Volcker will include.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Okay. And at that point you, representing the Iraqi Governing Council, are you willing to put forth any hard evidence, documents, whatever that you have, that will help Mr. Volcker in his investigation of this serious matter?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: As a former letter from the Governing Council has already stated to Mr. Kofi Annan, that we will cooperate and Iraq will cooperate fully with the U.N. and we hope that the U.N. will also make all the information that the Governing Council and the information that they've requested as part of my evidence, is made available to the Iraqis so they can see for themselves.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Good. Thank you.

As near as I can tell from news reports, that list and other related documents still haven't been turned over to the UN or any of the other investigating agencies. According to an AP story dated May 1st, when IGC member Jalal Talabani was asked whether the documents would be turned over to the Volcker Commission, he said: "Yes. If it will be necessary, it's ready."

In any case, the point is that these are very serious allegations. And various of the players involved in Iraq right now have motives not entirely consistent with having all the truth come out.

The motives of Chalabi's crew are obvious. A greater UN role in Iraq deals a further blow to his plans to run Iraq for fun and profit. At the same time, the US government -- paradox and irony -- is increasingly dependent on UN mediation to halt the rapid deterioration of the situation on the ground in the country. So the Bush administration and the CPA, whatever their more general animus toward the UN, at the moment needs the UN very much. Antagonizing the world body at the behest of our one-time Iraqi favorite, Chalabi, even if the underlying charges are valid, would be a further complication in an already complicated situation. All of these many contending interests cry out for an independent, credible and transparent investigation.

Let me be clear, I don't think any of this means that these allegations are not true. I figure that most of them are. But I say that mainly on the basis of the supposition that this hullabaloo wouldn't have gotten so far without there being something to it. And that's not a particularly good reason. And we're far enough down the line now where no great argument needs to be made that Mr. Chalabi lacks a certain credibility when it comes to the quality of information and the authenticity of documents.

--Josh Marshall

05.02.04 -- 3:15PM // link | recommend

There's a column by Jackson Diehl in today's Washington Post pointing to the power Ralph Nader's candidacy has gained by his embrace of opposition to the Iraq war. The point of the piece is that Kerry's opposition both to President Bush's policy and equally to any abrupt withdrawal of American forces leave a good deal of political room for an out-and-out anti-war candidate like Nader.

In terms of political dynamics I suspect Diehl is on to something. And I also think Kerry has yet to adequately calibrate his rhetoric -- something we'll discuss later. On a larger level, though, this piece captures Washington's and, really, the Washington Post's tendency to polarize this debate to its weakest, most simplistic extremes. Nader is consistent; Bush is consistent; Kerry, by failing to be an imbecile, is in the wishy-washy middle, neither fish nor fowl, a flipflopper, waiting for the next flip from which to flop.

--Josh Marshall

05.02.04 -- 12:57PM // link | recommend

There is a slew of new news to discuss, from the still-emerging scandal over the torture of Iraqi prisoners to the withdrawal from Fallujah, to the lies of the president who, at root, made all of this possible. Lies, particularly Big Lies, the sort that the media is least equiped to confront, are corrosive in their effect, breeding smaller, more situational deceptions and abuses, which spread like a dye into porous fabric.

We'll be covering each of these matters in the coming hours and days. But first, a note about this article in Newsweek which discusses US suspicions that Ahmed Chalabi and his close aides have been feeding the Iranians highly sensitive information about US security operations within Iraq.

This should not come as a great surprise. Chalabi's ties to the Iranians are well-known and have long been awkwardly acquiesced in by his supporters in Washington. Moreover, there have been plenty of warning signs of his willingness to play both sides of the fence. Chalabi and his supporters regularly take credit for trying to warn the US that a planned coup attempt, run by the CIA from Jordan in 1996, had been compromised and would fail.

High-ranking CIA agents, however, believed it was Chalabi who had tipped off the Iraqis because he -- i.e., Chalabi -- was not part of it, and thus would have been left out in the cold had it succeeded.

On this point, it has never been clear to me what the nature of the evidence was that made people at CIA believe this. And thus I cannot speak to or vouch for the quality of that evidence. On that point I want to be clear. But I've spoken to enough folks to be quite clear that this was their consensus view of what happened.

Then there's the matter of the bombing of the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad on August 7th, 2003. I'm told that the Jordanians have phone intercept intelligence, which they shared with the US government, showing that Chalabi had advance warning of the bombing, which he chose not to share with the Jordanians or the Americans.

Of course, we still fund Chalabi to the tune of some $340,000 a month. So don't think your tax dollars aren't being well-spent. And that does not include the various highly-lucrative contracts doled out to his family members, political associates and cronies.

--Josh Marshall

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