What is On The Table in Iraq
Specifically those agitating for immediate withdrawl and those seeking some form of continued presence. This is a delicate subject, what I am about to write is 100% contrarian to the two forming poles of opinion on Iraq. One is the “immediate withdrawl” crowd, the other is the “continued foreign presence” option. Neither are on the table, neither are going to work.
Let’s look at why.
What’s wrong with staying in
Realistically any change of occupation policy will require a change of regime in the United States. Given that the current Executive controls both houses of Congress, and there is no even improbable scenario which brings to the White House anyone of different persuasion – indulge your most arcane avian bird flu and Presidential succession scenario – its war hawks all the way down the depth chart – realistically, it means than any occupation scenario is basing its judgement on 2009.
By 2009, at reasonable estimates, there will be another 3500 US military fatalities in Iraq, there will be another 250 allied fatalities. There will be another 2000 mercenary fatalities. There will be some 40,000 Iraqi military dead – including government and rebel fighters. There will be some 200,000 incremental deaths in Iraq because of direct consequences of conflict, deprivation and crime. We are not talking, then, about “can we turn Iraq around today”. We are talking about “can we turn Iraq around after another 3 and a half years of civil war?”
It is useful to look, then, at two example failed states and their experiences. One is the Democratic Repbulic of the Congo. The other is Lebanon.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo disintegrated into failed state status and a defacto partition. It has been the scene of some 3 million deaths and twice that number of civilian casualties. In the Congo attempts to impose order with UN peace keepers have been insufficient, and indeed, many of the contingents from poorer nations have been engaged in war crimes, including rape and prostitution, in local areas. With all due respect for Professor Cole, who has proposed a “UN occupation” option staffed with armies from the “poor south” this is not a viable road. The reality of “poor south” countries is that they do not have large military surpluses over the needs of their regimes to remain in power, and their military institutions are not “professional, loyal, competent and patriotic”. It was for this reason that General Wesley Clark, who looked at this option in 2003 discarded it saying “it was my plan A… but the UN doesn’t have the political will.”
The disintegration of the Congo shows that the fears of those not wanting to withdraw are, indeed, justified. Namely, there is a substantial probability of a permanent state of civil war. However, the problem with occupation of any kind is shown by the experience in Lebanon – and in half a dozen other nations that could be listed – with occupying powers attempting to enforce unity.
The case of Lebanon, Syria has just ended nearly 30 years of occupation under various names. During those thirty years two entire civl war cycles have occurred, and Lebanon has known only a few years of stability among them. While originally supposed to be part of a pan-Arab force, the other partners dropped out, simply because the logistical and casualty problems mounted too quickly. Absent a compelling interest, there was no reason to stay. There were numerous incursions, a full scale invasion and period of occupation by Israel, and yet, no peace.
In short occupation, of any kind is no continued assurance of peace, or even a road to political stability.
The situation in Iraq is directly analogous to Lebanon – it is a country divided on sectarian lines owning to is creation as a buffer zone state in the colonial era. It has groups with standing paramilitary, and even in some cases light military, capability. These groups have functioning internal political systems, and those internal systems are capable of command and control of military operations and para-military campaigns of terror. Iraq shows the same reality.
Hence, what will most likely happen under a “Congo model” occupation is that civil war will continue regardless. A “continued US occupation” will look like Lebanon, as sectarian forces see control of the central government as a pawn in their attempt to impose their internal political structure on the entire nation.
Remember that any “heavy occupation” scenario will occur only in three and a half years time. There is no money for it from the US, and the Saudis will not pay for it, since Iraq’s oil coming on line very slowly suit their purposes entirely. Without the massive funds required to back this plan – which would require that the US reconfigure its logistical capabilities – there is no UN style occupation. More over, the scale of this occupation would be immense. Since troops from non-NATO members would be unarmored and without the cavalry capabilities –air cav and ground cav – one UN soldier would be equivalent to one Iraqi government soldier. These are losing straight up with the rebellion, often lead by Baathist elements. Saddam required a half a million man army to maintain power, and there is little reason to believe that a UN occupation could be effected on less than the number that Saddam, as a native with a native power base and long tenure, as well as complete control of the apparatus of government and infrastructure, could do.
In order to place 500,000 troops in Iraq, with a usual 3:1 deployment rotation means that for a heavy occupation of Iraq there must be a force pool of 1.5 million. Assuming the US provides its current 135,000 ground troops, and 500,000 of the force pool, this leaves a required force pool of 1 million with 370,000 troops. The US will have to supply the logistics for this.
Since the US does not have sufficient manpower to occupy on its own, there is exactly one nation that could participating effectively in a “heavy occupation” scenario: the People’s Republic of China. It, and only it, has the spare military capacity. The PRC currently has PPA forces in sufficient quantity to staff a massive occupation, and it has the ability to sustain losses. More over, it has unemployment problems which would make recruitment and occupation attractive. The cost of this heavy occupation to pay the PRC, at rates that would make participation attractive to them, would include a percentage of the oil flow, and cost per soldier near parity with placing an American soldier on the ground. The PRC would use this as a chance to acquire American tactics, equipment and other information. Since they would have to be transported on American logistical capability, since no other nation has the force projection logistical infrastructure of the US, they would rapidly learn about the details of how to organize such a force projection structure themselves. In short PRC participation would come at an enormous financial and military intelligence cost, and would do nothing to relieve the costs of oil which Iraq is currently creating.
Since there is no combination of participants which could be created which would have both the surplus military capacity, the logistical infrastructure, and the ability to finance the first two, there is no heavy occupation strategy in 2009 which is viable.
<B>What’s wrong with Withdrawl</b>
From the forgoing, withdrawl looks like a more feasible alternative. First, it could be effected politically by 2007, after a Congressional election that put a working majority of “out now” in place. Since there are defectors within the Republican party, it would not even require a change of majority, merely reduction below a working majority. It would even be possible for members of the Republican caucus intent on withdrawing from Iraq to threaten to vote for someone other than Hastert for Speaker as a way of forcing a withdraw time table to the floor.
Immediate withdrawl also has logistical simplicity – it would take more than a year to pull out in stages from Iraq, because each stage would have to protect the exit, and then “pull up the ladder”. However, this would be regarded politically as a detail. Moreover, the decision to exit would reduce casualties, since from that point on the US military would adopt a specific policy of risk avoidance.
However, as the examples from recent history should show, a withdraw now strategy would be lethal. The Iraqi government does not have the military capability to survive without inviting Iran in. This would force the Kurds to invite in the Syrians, or in the strangest of bedfellows, the Turks. Baghdad would be come Beruit on the Tigris.
The dire end of these predictions would create an oil spike which would move the cost of crude oil above the PPI adjusted cost of the 1981 spike, and generate a recession of comparable magnitude to the 1981-1982 recession. While not in the scale of the Great Depression, it would be enough to destablize the global trade order, which, after all, relies on cheap energy for transportation, and to manufacture goods in poor nations with even lower energy efficiency per GDP than the US.
Those advocating withdrawing paint unrealistically rosy scenarios of political understanding between the factions. The reality of civil and modern military conflict is that what separates low intensity conflict from high intensity conflict is the fear of damaging vital infrastructure and economic modus vivendi. Once this is disrupted, that is, once previous infrastructure is written off, the fighting becaomes much more bitter, because then only by extermination or some other form of absolute victory can one side rebuild and profit. Since Iraq’s infrastructure is already discounted, and the value is all safe from reach of conflict, there is nothing standing in the way of an unlimited civil war, or a “Columbianization” of Iraq, into areas that are under, effectively, a parallel rebel government that supports itself on the resource extraction economy that is possible even at conflict rates.
<B>Political Disconnect and It’s Costs</B>
A problem in American society is an increasing disconnect between the inside and outside political conversations. The public at large is focusing on two options, heavy occupation and rapid withdrawl, which are not realistically on the table. In such circumstances, what happens is a continuation of the status quo until there is sufficient deterioration to create a change in political climate.
Given current circumstances, the overwhelming likelihood is that this will entail a gain of withrdawlist House members in 2006, but without the working majority needed to force change. The current executive needs both the face saving of continued occupation of Iraq on current terms, and the $90 Billion dollars a year in slush fund that it allows them to extract from the Federal Budget – that is to say, 75% of the free cashflow of the Federal Government. For a coalition that held the White House by 100,000 votes in Ohio, and the House by less than 300,000 votes, this pork is essential to their ability to hold all of the levers of political power. Since they must do this to avoid investigation for the assorted criminal actions that were taken to take, and keep, power, they are not going to give in on this until forced by a direct vote backed by a direct threat of investigation.
What will follow is an even more withdrawl oriented Congress in 2008’s elections, and a “cut and run” exit strategy. The consequences of this will be an unraveling of the global trade order, a world wide recession and the collapse of the global housing bubble.
<B>What is on the table</B>
The objectives that have been bandied about are not on the table, there is no upside to any policy option. Iraq has been a conflict zone since 1979, the best that can happen is a gradual reduction in the conditions that have brought about that conflict zone and the reaching of a point of stability. A stable Iraq will then begin to have oil revenues flowing in, and this will create a constituency for continued stability itself. Long wish lists are unrealistic, for example the New Republic went pony shopping in Baghdad again.
From the perspective of preventing the downside, realistically what is on the table is managed disintegration of Iraq. The end game is to prevent a recurrence of 1978-1980, where the disintegration of two US client states into nationalist entities erupted into war. The options on the table are:
<UL>
<LI>Continued light occupatipon with graduall withdrawl to hard points.
<li>Withdrawl in 2007.
<li>Some new policy in 2009, though not heavy occupation, which is economically and militarily non-viable.
<li>
Judged from the perspective of managing the disintegration of Iraq, the first option is terrible – it will allow the Iranians proxy entre into Iraq, without risking much, if anything, of their own. It will allow proxy wars to continue, since states of a mind to intervene in Iraq may do so merely by supply the rebellion, or by supplying factions in the government. The first option leads to a soft defacto partition of Iraq, and continued civil war. Since it is also expensive – in money, manpower and strategic commitment, sooner or later, it turns in to withdrawl as soon as the “cut and run consensus” wins an election.
No nation will take over for the US light occupation in this event.
Withdrawl is even worse – it merely gives in, allows Iraq to disintegrate into proxy spheres of influence. The central government of Iraq will not have a military capable of maintaining order for another three to five years. Hence those who “hope the Iraqis can work it out” are whistling in the wind. The reality is that Iraq will fall apart, simply because it is to the advantage of its most effective neighbors that it do so. Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran all have an interest in an Iraq in civil war. It will be the Congo with oil.
What other options are there? There really is only one option, and it will not happen because there is no consensus for it.
In the modern period there is a sharp dividing line between low intensity and high intensity conflict. Low intensity conflict is conflict without disrupting economic infrastructure. However, once that infrastructure has been written off or disrupted, there is no barrier to high intensity conflict. The saddle point consumes a country rapidly. Thus, those seeking to move conflict to a higher level have a simple project: disrupt infrastructure. In societies where the value is from resource extraction, this point is easier to reach, since what is above the ground is easy to replace. This is why conflicts in nations such as Columbia can go on year after year. This is why Iraq has remained a conflict zone for nearly three decades, and will continue to be one for the foreseeable future.
The only road to a stable solution set is to partition Iraq formally, and embroil directly the regional powers so that they cannot promote their interests destructively without cost. This is an unpalatable direction for policy, it will strengthen Iran, end Iraq as a bulwark against Farsi expansionism, and create three states all of which are dependent on the outside for their continued existence. However, Iraq in any other scenario becomes a giant Lebanon with oil, and Iran is already uncontained.
This last point bears repeating: Iran is already uncontained, and a near deterent nation. It has already created a sphere of influence in Afghanistan in the wake of the US failure to stabilize that nation and the de facto partition of Afghanistan. The desire to contain Iran is one of the reasons for continued light occupation, the hope that Iraq’s political and military situation can be stabilized with the eye to being able to remain a bulwark against Iran. It is a vain hope.
<B>Summary</B>
Current political discussion in Iraq is a waste of time, it involves either discussing options that are not on the table – such as heavy occupation – or it involves discussing options that are, in total cost, even more costly than the current light occupation strategy. Light occupation as it is, is asking for distater, cut and run is asking for catastrophe.
The pervasive disconnect between elites and the public on Iraq has been in place since the first Gulf War, when Bush did not explain to the American public that since the Arabs were paying for the war, they got to pick the end state – namely Saddam in power, and Iraq’s oil off-line. The costs of this policy were enormous, far more than the money paid to a broke American government at the time.
In the run up to Iraq, the desire to put Iraq’s oil on line as the only solution to macro-economic problems that did not involve a major shift of the US economy, was also not discussed. In effect, the 2000 election was an election over whether Iraq would be invaded, and the US public voted against having energy efficiency – which was the only other viable policy.
In the present a third major decision is being made, one where Iraq is being treated as disconnected from oil prices, economic policy and the large questions of how America wants to direct its future. Iraq, the policy, is not a solution to the problems of the future, but its continuation has a great deal to say about whether the worst case scenarios come to fruition. No one is explaining to the public that an Iraq policy has to be intended to do one thing: prevent oil from reaching 100 dollars a barrel.
Light occupation and concession do not do this, nor does declaring defeat and going home. Heavy occupation is not viable as a policy, since there is no combination of money, manpower and logistical muscle to accomplish it. The only effective policy is one that requires the competing outside powers to be formally involved in promoting stability, rather than beng able to profit from instability. This means a formal partition of Iraq, one into seperate, sovereign, nations. Other roads lead to continuation of Iraq as a conflict zone.
This disconnect has created three poles of consensus, none of which are viable. This assures that when the decision is made, it will be made without reference to the American public – except in debased form of some poll question that is about an emotionalized version of the issue – and that it will almost certainly be the wrong decision.
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Take a clue...
The military industrialists are laughing all the way to the bank. For them it is a no lose situation. Tons of money is pouring into their businesses/bank accounts the longer the war goes on...
And when its over... the money won't stop.. there will be new anti terror systems and programs and blah blah blah. We are held hostage to the military monster.
You may have forgotton that just before 9.11 there was an "investigation" of missing TRILLIONS of dollars in the "defense" department. 9.11 pout that on the "back burner".... more like dropped like a hot potato.
I can assure you all that when there is a real reason to defend this nation... it's citizens will come forth and serve in any way. What we have seen since WWII is just corrupt military intervention into other nations for the benefit of "free market capitalism"... and the military monster is PART of the corporate waste. We spend trillion on ICBMs which we dismantlled... nukes... boomers and on and on. Our economy has the cancer of the military so deeply integrated that it is almost impossible to excise it without taking the nation down.
But the point is brilliant that a bunch of "towel heads" to use their term... is screwing the entire US military. hahahahaha
June 23, 2005 10:16 AM | Reply | Permalink
It is a game that wroks, until it doesn't.
June 23, 2005 11:55 AM | Reply | Permalink
If only the sheeple would read something like this instead of waiting to find out what Britt Hume thinks we should do.
Thank You for taking the time to write this!
June 23, 2005 12:15 PM | Reply | Permalink