Here are the PDF-tabs showing Rice's written responses, and the other tabs listed on Levin's website.

Comments I and II look at the OVP records retention requirements under Geneva: This link Rice, through the POW abuse meetings, with Addington, Rizzo and Chertoff who visited Guantanamo.

Data Mining

For the moment, we'll dig into the SASC10 Tab documents which include Rice's written responses and other tabls.

38 of 42 lists the Geneva conventions. This means the prisoners of war were known to be protected by Geneva; and the policies should have been consistent with Geneva.

This document removes all doubt that Geneva was "not clearly connected" with what the US government was doing when detaining prisoners. DOJ OLC cannot credibly argue there was "ambiguity" about whether the US had legal duties as a detaining power when the US government documents expressly reference the Geneva Conventions related to prisoners.

Civilian Detention

Look at the reference list item d. Army regulation 190-8: Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees. . . "October 1st, 1997

This is a pre-9-11 docuent relted to civilians. there is no excuse for the US to have, at either Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, or the CIA blacksites, to have claimed "after 9-11, the US could abuse anyone."

Even US citizens cannot be treated this way, yet the US Congress has turned a blind eye to this President's abuses agaisnt American civilians.

The US lawyers cannot argue they were unclear about the legal requirements. The DoD documents show the US government knew of legal requirements applicable to civilians; and that the US, as a detaining power, had a legal obligation to respect the specific legal requirements appliable to civilians, POWs, and others at any US-connected facility.

It should have been known that moving the POWs to Guantanano or a black site in E. Europe would not make a different over whether or not civilians can be mistreated. What makes the abuse detestable is that without a trial, the United States government subjected non-charged personnel to abuse. That is backwards. Punishment can only be inflicted after a trial.

War of Choice

These documents show, when caught, the American legal community and President made excuses for war crimes; but did not timely implement a credible oversight system ensuring all known-Geneva-requirements were adequately implemented in a war of choice in Iraq. That is evidence of reckless planning before the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

The war of choice was not urgent, but moving along an arbitrary timeline without regard to well known, applicable Geneva requirements. These are issues of international criminal law.

- Why wasn't the 1950-era Geneva requirements factored into war planning before the Iraq invasion?

- Why did the President not ensure -- before the invasion of Iraq -- there were adequate personnel in DoD to ensure all Geneva-treaty obligations were fully met?

Congress has no excuse for not confronting this President over war crimes.

34 of 42 shows a weekly status report.

33 of 42 Colonel Moulton discussing with "Ron Mcneal, GS14" a DoD OPR. There would be other messages discussing this OPR by name.

30 of 42 references a "word" document, implicitly suggesting that the original word file would show who else made changes to the document.

Another Example

This is similar to the data trace done on the DoD documents transferred into the White House; or ones which former DoD personnel, subsequently assigned to the white house, were linked with word documents connected with the DoD emails. Here is a sample check-sum done on one word document to trace it to the White House.

29 of 42 COMSEC audit done.

This is a communications audit done on communiation systems to ensure they meet legal requirements applicable to DoD. This would create several records:

- Trip reports
- Travel records
- Funding flows through DoD pay
- Official orders
- A completed inspection report
- Summary provided to commanders
- NSA-related communiations on the status of the NSA-related secure communications

29 of 42

Item "c" suggests DoD personnel are being detained in Columbia:

"The SOUTHCOM Personnel Recovery Support Team remains on a 24-hour recall standby to support Combatant commander requirements should Columbian rebels release detained DoD personnel."

If this were speculative or a contingency, unclear why others, other than "Columbian rebels" were listed. Seems too specific to believe that DoD personnel are not actually being detained, and the US is awaiting their release for recovery.

28 of 42 mentions Ft. Huachuca (spelled in the DoD document incorrectly, "Huchuca".

This connects the DoD with the same facility which is alleged to have been complicit with the NSA domestic surveillance data mining; the DOD military analysts; and the domestic use of NSA-data to coordinate CIFA-JTTF activities against American civilians without a warrant.

NSA Telecoms

This implicitly means the contractors involved with domestic data mining had a role in uploading information to the NSA, using that to target Americans' communications without a warrant despite the FISA requirement during wartime to work with the FISA court.

25 of 42 Home STU-3 call

This indicates that someone has a home-based classified voice communication system. The STU-III is something which encrypts data. To have one installed at home implies an important, 24-hour requirement to conduct sensitive communications. There would be records of similar systems, and other records of like communications.

Discovery

This memo fatally discloses the existence of a conversation over a classified communication system, and allows us to inquire into the details of that now-disclosed, non-classified aspects of that conversation.

Foolishly, the comment in the disclosed summary includes specific J3 communications, names, and other identifying information. This is important to follow-up to ask specific people about specific records, meetings, and other events related to this now-disclosed classified conversation.

Note they allowed "active demonstration" which is not something well understood. We've been led to believe they were merely passive, and wholly disconnected from any offensive training.

Moulton and Kleiman, part of the now-disclosed STU-III conversation appeared before the Senate, where this question arose:

Kleinman Testimony: Why did the special operations community find it necessary—and appropriate—to request interrogation support from an organization whose mission was, and is, to teach resistance to interrogation?

It's unclear how the specific STU-III call fits into this question or answer at the Senate hearing.

22 of 42 redactions on email distribution list.

Note: J355C