Academic Economists like to point out that the real puzzle of political participation is not why so many people don't vote, but why so many people do.  Using a straightforward cost-benefit analysis, these scholars note that the benefit of voting cannot overcome the costs.  The benefit of voting is represented as the probability of casting the deciding vote in favor of one's preferred candidate multiplied by the value of that candidate's victory.  The cost of voting consists of taking time off work, transportation to the polls, time spent waiting in line, etc.  Those costs are typically treated fixed.  Opinions differ on where information comes into play.  Some models treat it as a fixed cost, others treat it as an influence on the certainty the voter has over her candidate preferences.  In either case, gathering information is costly, and at best reduces uncertainty about preferences, the value of which are reduced by the minuscule probability of casting the deciding vote.  In all, these economists project a negative overall utility (benefits minus costs) leading them to conclude that voting is irrational.

Sociologists and Political Scientists respond in various ways.  The most common counter-arguments take note of the fact that there are fixed benefits associated with voting: satisfying a sense of civic duty, being part of a community, etc., often characterized as "expressive" or "solidary" benefits, as opposed to the "instrumental" benefits of casting the deciding vote.

What I've come to see in the Republican issue strategy is a really quite frightening.  They hit upon a simple (but incorrect) solution that dovetails with their ideology and constituency, and flog it mercilessly despite the fact that it has no merit whatsoever.  Thus we get "drill baby drill" and "the problem with Freddie and Fannie is that they got too big for the taxpayers to continue supporting." 

This does two things in the voting model.  First, it increases the perceived amount of information (nothing in the model says the information must be correct).  This either reduces costs or increases certainty over preferences.  This in turn increases participation among those who are aligned ideologues or constituents.  Second, it increases the solidary and expressive benefits of those choosing the Republican ticket.  Satisfying the civic duty, for example, presumes that the voter is making a responsible choice.  Voters understand that vote choice should be a matter of policy preferences, not personality.  Thus, any candidate that can make the voter feel better informed can align the candidate preference part of the model with the expressive benefits component.  It increases the fixed benefit, but only if the voter chooses the ticket that provides the simple (albeit incorrect) policy proposal.  In the end, it makes increased turnout contingent upon selecting a particulary candidate.

All this is to say that any candidate who can make solutions seem simple (if not to implement, at least to understand) can do himself an enormous favor.  It's a boon to the common good and the future success of the candidate's career if those solutions turn out to be correct, but being correct doesn't help much in the election.  The goal is to make the voters feel smarter about public policy than they were the day before.  It's not just a matter of ego, or resentment, or all the other buttons that get pushed with charges of "elitism."  It taps into the urge to satisfy one's civic duty.  It's the difference between saying, "I'm going to vote for him because he understands the problem," and "I'm going to vote for him because I understand the problem, and his understanding of the problem makes sense to me."